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Liability Laundering and
Denial of Justice
CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
AND THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
This Note explores the conflicts between two bodies of
law implicated by a specific and growing class of cases. The
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) grants federal jurisdiction over
cases brought by aliens alleging tortious violations of
international law. 1 Victims and human rights groups have
increasingly used the ATS as an enforcement tool against
governmental and corporate human rights violators. 2 The
government contractor defense extends sovereign immunity to
contractors of the U.S. government in certain circumstances. 3
The conflicts between these two bodies of law arise when aliens
injured in violation of international law sue government
contractors such as the contractors involved in the Abu Ghraib
scandal. 4 This Note addresses the conflicts that arise in this
particular class of cases: suits brought by aliens against
government contractors for torts in violation of international
law. These cases are important because they often seek to
redress human rights abuses such as torture, slavery, and
These cases are also increasing in frequency
genocide. 5
1
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). The brief text of the ATS is as follows: “The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
2
Plaintiffs claiming injuries in violation of international law have brought
hundreds of suits under the ATS within the last two decades. Before 1980, the ATS
was practically unnoticed. This Note will discuss this trend in greater depth infra Part
II.B.
3
See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (adopting the
government contractor defense as federal common law and setting forth the standard
for when the Defense may be raised). This Note will refer to the government contractor
defense simply as “the Defense.”
4
Courts have interpreted the ATS broadly to allow plaintiffs to use the
Alien Tort Statute to deter human rights violations. Suits brought under the ATS
against government contractors are likely to increase in number, but the Defense may
bar these suits. See infra Parts III.B, IV.A.
5
See generally Terry Collingsworth, Boundaries in the Field of Human
Rights: The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15
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because the U.S. government’s reliance on military contractors
This Note
is at an unprecedented and growing level. 6
concludes that Congress or the federal courts should disallow
the Defense in cases brought under the ATS, subject to case-bycase exceptions where an executive order immunizes a
particular defendant.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Alien Tort Statute 7 allows federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 8 The ATS thus grants federal subject matter
jurisdiction when an alien alleges a tort and that the tort
committed was in violation of “the law of nations” (now usually
The effect of this
referred to as “international law”). 9
requirement is that cases using the ATS as a basis for
jurisdiction tend to allege human rights abuses severe enough
to violate international human rights norms. 10 This short
Statute, enacted in 1789 by the first Congress, received very
little attention until the late twentieth century. 11 Then, in

HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 186-95 (2002) (describing the history of the Unocal case and
several similar ATS cases). Unocal and other examples are discussed in Part II.B,
infra.
6
For a discussion of the United States’ growing reliance on private
contractors, see infra Part IV.A.
7
Commentators also refer to the Alien Tort Statute interchangeably as the
Alien Tort Claims Act. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42
VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 587 (2002) (“[Section 1350] is today commonly referred to as the
‘Alien Tort Statute’ or, sometimes less accurately, the ‘Alien Tort Claims Act.’”). This
Note will refer to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as the Alien Tort Statute, the ATS, or simply, “the
Statute.”
8
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). As will be discussed below, the meaning of “law of
nations” has changed through the years. Currently, the international community
interprets the “law of nations” to include law governing relationships among
governments and law governing the rights of individuals. See infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
9
See, e.g., Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“Under the [Alien Tort Statute], therefore, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists
when (1) an alien, (2) claims a tort, (3) was committed in violation of a United States
treaty or the ‘law of nations’ – the latter now synonymous with ‘customary
international law.’”) (citations omitted). This Note will use the term “ATS suits” to
refer to those cases which base subject matter jurisdiction on the ATS, and the term
“ATS plaintiffs” to refer to the alien plaintiffs in ATS suits (who by definition must
allege a tort in violation of international law).
10
A more specific history of these cases follows below. See infra Part II.B.
11
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (currently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350). Congress has modified the ATS several times since its enactment, but
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1980, a Second Circuit case, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, opened the
door for aliens to use this unique Statute to redress human
rights abuses abroad. 12 The ATS is unique because it deviates
from the traditionally-required nexus between a federal court’s
jurisdiction over foreign matters and the connection of the
subject matter to the territory of the government that the court
represents. 13 The ATS does not require such territoriality; it
makes an unusual grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
allowing an alien to sue for a tort committed abroad by anyone,
including another alien. 14 That is, it allows district courts to
find subject matter jurisdiction without any connection
between the facts of the case and American territory or
citizens. 15 The ATS provides an increasingly important means
by which aliens may sue for injuries they sustained in violation
of international law against other alien individuals or
corporations or against American individuals or corporations.
For example, aliens have used the ATS to sue officers of an
abusive foreign dictatorship using torture 16 and against
companies using forced (slave) labor. 17 Human rights scholars
and practitioners agree that the ATS has the potential to
become an important human rights enforcement tool. 18
Another body of law, the government contractor defense,
only slightly. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 587 n.2 (citing and quoting “minor
alterations” to the Alien Tort Statute that were made in 1873 and 1911).
12
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing the
district court, which had dismissed the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction).
13
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987) (describing the various means through which territorial
connections may confer jurisdiction in international matters).
14
See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887-90; see also Andrea Bianchi, International
Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 751, 777
(2004) (“In many ways, given the general lack of inclination shown by US courts to pay
due heed to international legal issues, litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act is
somewhat an anomaly.”).
15
See, e.g., Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (upholding jurisdiction over a case
brought by Paraguayan plaintiffs against a Paraguayan defendant for actions taking
place outside United States territory).
16
See, e.g., id. at 878 (alleging that defendant Paraguayan police official was
responsible for torturing plaintiffs’ son/brother to death).
17
See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (alleging that defendant multinational corporation was responsible for
killings connected with suppression of union activities); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (alleging that defendant multinational
corporation benefited from forced labor by Burmese villagers), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
18
See, e.g., Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor
Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203,
210 (2004); see also infra note 122.
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threatens to prevent the ATS from realizing its full potential by
barring otherwise valid ATS suits.
The Supreme Court adopted the government contractor
defense as federal common law in 1988 in Boyle v. United
The Defense bars suits against certain
Technologies. 19
government contractors by preempting state tort law. 20 It
extends the U.S. government’s sovereign immunity to shield
government contractors acting on behalf of the government. 21
For example, a military jeep manufacturer might be able to use
the Defense to immunize against suits by passengers injured
because of design flaws in the vehicle. Though the lower
federal courts’ rationales for applying the Defense varied, 22 the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Boyle was that the Defense was
necessary to protect the discretion of federal officials. 23
The two bodies of law created by the ATS and the
Defense clash in situations where aliens sue government
contractors for torts committed in violation of international
law. Human rights organizations, scholars, and practitioners
who support the current, broad interpretation of the ATS see it
as a human rights tool to deter illegal activity and compensate
Allowing contractor-defendants to rely on the
victims. 24
Defense in cases asserting jurisdiction under the ATS
threatens the ATS’s effectiveness as a human rights tool. This
is because the Defense allows “liability laundering,” a means by
which the government may use its private contractors to
diffuse or eliminate accountability for violations of
international law committed by the government. Though this
scheme may sound unusual, the U.S. government’s increasing
reliance on private contractors to provide an ever-broadening
array of services, especially in military operations, makes this

19

487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). The Boyle majority analogized the Defense’s
immunity to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which generally waives the federal
government’s sovereign immunity while retaining it in certain circumstances. See 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; infra text accompanying notes 151-54.
20
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 (explaining the government contractor defense
and the test used to determine when a defendant may raise the Defense).
21
Id.
22
For example, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning that the Defense should stand as an extension of the Feres doctrine. Id. at
510. In Feres, the Supreme Court held that the federal government is not liable in tort
to active duty military personnel under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). See infra notes 166, 168, 172 and accompanying text.
23
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509-12 (reviewing the possible rationales for
applying the Defense).
24
See infra notes 66, 73, 74 and accompanying text.
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a growing area of concern. 25 For example, some of the victims
of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal filed a suit against
If the contractormilitary contractors under the ATS. 26
defendants in that case are successful in raising the Defense,
they will enjoy immunity from suit and the government will be
able to use contractors as a cheap, reliable way to do its “dirty
work.”
Further, allowing the Defense would block all paths to
redress for the victims of extraterritorial torts committed by
U.S. government contractors. The government itself enjoys
broad sovereign immunity to these suits. 27 Since sovereign
immunity protects the government, and the Defense extends
this immunity to the government’s contractors, allowing the
Defense will bar injured plaintiffs from suing either potential
defendant. This means the plaintiffs will be unable to seek
damages, and thus unable to deter future instances of similar
behavior. 28 There are several ways to resolve the conflict
between these two bodies of law, 29 but courts should not allow
the government contractor defense to diminish the ATS’s
utility.
Part II of this Note will provide background information
about the ATS, its history and related policies, the chain of
cases leading up to its current interpretation, and examples of
its modern applications. Part III will address the background
of the government contractor defense, its rationale, and its

25
As of mid-2004, analyst Peter W. Singer estimated that over 20,000 private
military contractors were working for the United States in Iraq. Bob Dart, Pentagon’s
Reliance on Contractors Under Fire, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 8, 2004, at 9A.
26
See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004). This case
was filed in September 2004 on behalf of the prisoners at the Abu Ghraib detention
center. The Second Amended Complaint contains a disturbing series of allegations
against the defendants, which were private interrogation services contractors. See
Second Amended Complaint at 14-46, Saleh v. Titan Corp., (S.D. Cal. 2004) (No. 04 CV
1143 R (NLS)), 2004 WL 1881616.
27
Several exceptions in the Federal Tort Claims Act could retain sovereign
immunity to cases based on facts that are likely to underlie a suit brought under the
ATS against a government contractor. See infra Part III.A.
28
Though it may be argued that plaintiffs might seek redress in local courts
or invoke occupation law to bypass sovereign immunity, these options are outside the
scope of this discussion. Local courts are unlikely to be a reliable option in areas with a
heavy concentration of government contractors, especially military contractors.
Occupation law may provide an avenue for a suit against the government, but does not
necessarily allow suits against the contractors themselves. See David J. Scheffer,
Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842, 858 (2003). For more on occupation
law as a potential solution to the conflicts in ATS suits against government contractors,
see note 242 and accompanying text.
29
See infra Part IV.B.1.
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applications. Part IV will discuss the conflict between the
policies and case law of the ATS and the Defense and suggest a
possible solution. Part V will conclude that the policies
underlying the ATS should take priority over those underlying
the Defense. Part V therefore suggests that Congress or the
courts should disallow the Defense in cases brought under the
ATS.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

The intended purposes of the ATS are unclear. 30 For
years after its enactment, very few cases mentioned the ATS. 31
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted the ATS’s
obscurity in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.: “This old but little used section
is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since
the first Judiciary Act, no one seems to know whence it came.” 32
Though the ATS remained dormant for almost 200
years, it has enjoyed recent attention from the international
human rights community for its potential as a human rights
enforcement tool. 33 Courts have generally been amenable to
this application of the Statute, so the trend for the past two
decades has been to broaden the ATS. 34 Most commentators
agree that the ATS now shows great potential for alien
plaintiffs, but opinions are mixed as to whether the Statute is a
white knight or an “awakening monster.” 35 On one side,
30
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining that
there is no widely accepted purpose for the Alien Tort Statute); Eugene Kontorovich,
The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 183, 209 (2004) (“Neither the Constitution nor ATCA expressly resolves the
jurisdictional questions, and ATCA lacks legislative history that could provide
illumination.”).
31
See Anthony D’Amato, Preface to THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN
ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY, at vii (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999)
(“The [Statute] was adopted by the first Congress in 1789 and promptly went into
hibernation for nearly two centuries.”). For statistics on the use of the ATS over its 200
year history, see infra note 65.
32
IIT, 519 F.2d at 1015 (citation omitted); see also Kenneth C. Randall,
Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 nn.15-17 (1985) (discussing the
ATS’s sparse pre-Filártiga history).
33
See infra notes 118-20, 122-30, and accompanying text.
34
See Linda A. Willett et al., The Alien Tort Statute and Its Implications for
Multinational Corporations, BRIEFLY . . ., Sept. 2003, at 1, 16 (“Following the
precedents it established in Filártiga and Kadic, the Second Circuit has continued to
issue cutting-edge rulings that give broad interpretation to the Alien Tort
Statute . . . .”).
35
See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Institute for International Economics
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human rights advocates endorse a broad interpretation of the
ATS, such as the interpretation adopted in Filártiga v. PeñaIrala. 36 Filártiga established the precedent of reading the ATS
broadly to allow a suit by an alien against another alien
Multinational corporations and
government official. 37
economists who oppose this broad interpretation of the ATS
emphasize the potential negative effects on commerce and on
The ATS is now a part of an
corporate defendants. 38
increasingly heated international debate over the utility and
desirability of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 39 To address the
modern purposes of the ATS, a review of the theories of the
origin and intended purposes of the Statute is in order.
A.

Theories of the Origin and Purposes of the Alien Tort
Statute

Scholars and historians have put forth several theories
to explain the original purposes of the ATS. 40 There is no
consensus on a single theory, 41 but all theories of the original
purposes of the ATS share the notion that the ATS’s drafters
were concerned with the protection of a young nation in an
unstable international political climate. 42 This Note now
examines three of the prominent theories of the ATS’s origin,
the denial of justice theory, the diplomatic safety theory, and
the international duty theory.
2003) (reviewing in detail the economic damage that may result from broadening use of
the Alien Tort Statute).
36
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see, e.g., Anne-Marie
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM.
J. INT’L L. 461, 461 (1989).
37
See Willett, supra note 34, at 16.
38
See, e.g., HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35, at 37-43 (arguing that
ATS suits will inhibit trade and foreign direct investment).
39
Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The
question of defining ‘the law of nations’ is a confusing one which is hotly debated,
chiefly among academics.”); see, e.g., HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35
(estimating the potential economic impact of ATS litigation); Emika Duruigbo, The
Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien
Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 2 (2004) (responding to Hufbauer and
Mitrokostas).
40
See Burley, supra note 36, at 464, 469, 475, 481.
41
Id. at 463 (“[B]attle has been joined on this ground [the history of the
Statute], giving rise to a new paper chase through the legislative history of the First
Judiciary Act, the constitutional debates, the Founders’ papers and the proceedings of
the Continental Congress.”).
42
See id. at 464 (“All the existing theories about the historical origins of the
statute essentially depict it as part of the protective armor designed to shield a young
and vulnerable nation in a dangerous and unpredictable world.”).
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1. The Denial of Justice Theory
“Denial of justice” is an antiquated legal term referring
to a nation’s denial to non-citizens of access to – and fair
process in – that nation’s courts. 43 Historically (and to some
degree, currently), a nation that commits a denial of justice is
responsible to pay damages to the injured non-citizen’s
nation. 44 Proponents of the denial of justice theory note that at
the time of its enactment, the drafters may have intended the
ATS to provide a vent for tensions between foreign nations and
the fledgling United States, then a relatively weak and
disorganized nation. 45 This theory posits that the drafters were
responding to concerns about the escalation of a civil wrong
into international tension. That is, denial of access to the court
system to an alien injured in America could set off a chain of
events eventually leading to armed conflict. At the time,
Alexander Hamilton saw such an escalation to war as a
reasonable response to a denial of justice. 46
The leap from an injured alien to a declaration of war
may seem unlikely today, as the United States is now in a
vastly different political and economic position. 47 However,
43
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 711 cmt. a (1987).
44
The current Restatement of Foreign Relations still, though narrowly,
recognizes denial of justice as an injury. Id. (“[T]he phrase ‘denial of justice’ is used
narrowly, to refer only to injury consisting of, or resulting from, denial of access to
courts, or denial of procedural fairness and due process in relation to judicial
proceedings, whether criminal or civil.”); id. at reporter’s n.2 (“Before the development
of the contemporary law of human rights, states were held responsible for injury to
aliens consisting of, or resulting from, various acts or omissions deemed to violate an
international standard of justice or other standards accepted in customary
international law.”).
45
Burley, supra note 36, at 465.
46
Hamilton suggests in The Federalist No. 80 that a grant of federal
jurisdiction over cases concerning aliens would diminish the possibility of such an
escalation:

The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of
justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other
countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the
public faith, than to the security of the public tranquility.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 500-01 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
47
See James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights Upon
Conquest and Under Occupation Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context, 25 U. PA.
J. INT’L ECON. L. 491, 506 & n.55 (2004) (“The best statement of American hegemony
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there may be relevant modern analogs of Hamilton’s concern. 48
While miltary conflict with established world powers no longer
poses the imminent threat to the United States that it did in
the eighteenth century, a denial of justice today might lead to
terrorist retribution and non-war civilian casualties. 49
2. The Diplomatic Safety Theory
The diplomatic safety theory is a narrower variant of
the denial of justice theory. The diplomatic safety theory
argues that Congress enacted the ATS to provide access to
courts specifically for other nations’ diplomats. 50 This view is
supported by Blackstone’s Commentaries (written contemporaneously with the enactment of the ATS) which states that
“[i]nfringement of the rights of embassadors” was one of three
“principal offences against the law of nations[.]” 51 Thus, the
ATS would help protect ambassadors’ rights, which would
avoid international tension caused by a violations of a principal
international offense. 52
Historical research suggests that one episode in
particular, the “Marbois Affair,” may have sparked political
interest in the protection of ambassadors. 53 In 1784, the
begins with the proclamation that ‘[t]he United States possesses unprecedented- and
unequaled-strength and influence in the world.’”) (quoting NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL,
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2002)).
48
See supra note 44.
49
Part IV.A.2 infra discusses these modern threats in greater detail.
50
See Burley, supra note 36, at 469 (referring to the ATS as an “Ambassador
Protection Plan”).
51
5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 68 (1803).
Judge Bork relies in part on the diplomatic safety theory in his
concurrence in a 1984 ATS case. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 81314 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“The principal offences against the law of
nations, animadverted on as such by the municipal laws of England, [were] of three
kinds: 1. Violation of safeconducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and,
3. Piracy.”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68, 72, quoted in W.W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 459
(1953)); see also id. at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting same passage with trivial
spelling variation from 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (Welsby ed. 1854)).
The Tel-Oren concurrences are discussed further infra Part II.B.2.
52
As further evidence of the importance of diplomatic safety in the
eighteenth century, the U.S. Constitution grants original Supreme Court jurisdiction
over cases involving ambassadors. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1, 2.
53
See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over
Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 491-94
(1986) (discussing the history of the events of the Marbois affair and their connection to
the enactment of the ATS).
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Chevalier De Longchamps insulted Francis Barbe Marbois, the
French Consul-General, in Pennsylvania, which led to a public
argument and assault in the streets of Philadelphia. 54 No
federal courts existed at the time of the Marbois affair. Thus,
the federal government, though ostensibly responsible for
international diplomacy, was unable to resolve a simple assault
case to protect the honor of a diplomat. This federal impotence
led to international outrage, including formal protests from
foreign diplomats and American politicians; it demonstrated
the United States’ need for a federal court system. 55 So, this
theory goes, Congress enacted the ATS to prevent further
incidents like the Marbois Affair and their ensuing
international backlash. 56
3. The International Duty Theory
As an alternative to the cluster of interrelated national
defense theories, Professor Burley (now Dean Slaughter)
posited that it was a higher sense of international duty – not
self-preservation – that moved the ATS’s drafters. 57 The
international duty theory suggests that “the country was ready
to shoulder a perceived national duty to enforce international
law as it related to individual conduct.” 58 Some originalists

54

Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111 (1784) (“[I]t
appeared, that De Longchamps and Monsieur Marbois . . . entered into a long
conversation, in the course of which, the latter said that he would complain to the civil
authority, and the former replied, ‘you are a Blackguard.’”); Casto, supra note 53, at
491.
55
See Casto, supra note 53, at 491 & n.138. Eventually, a Pennsylvania
state court tried and convicted the Chevalier of criminal technical assault – in violation
of the law of nations. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 117.
56
See Casto, supra note 53, at 492-95 (describing the effect of the Marbois
Affair on American society, politics, and legislation). But see Burley, supra note 36, at
469-73 (criticizing the diplomatic safety theory and concluding that the Alien Tort
Statute could not have been motivated by ambassadorial protection because the only
suit brought to defend Marbois’ honor was a criminal suit, not civil, as is a tort suit).
Indeed, Blackstone noted that suits to vindicate ambassadorial rights were criminal
common-law suits. See Casto, supra note 53, at 489-90 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *67, *70-71 (1783)); see also Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, 97 Eng.
Rep. 936, 938 (K.B. 1764) (upholding diplomatic immunity as part of the common law
of England in a case argued by Blackstone and decided by Judge Mansfield); The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination.”).
57
See generally Burley, supra note 36, at 475-88.
58
Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV., 1359, 1364 (2002).
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argue that the term “law of nations” included only rules
governing relations among nations (and not between
individuals and nations) and so the intent of the ATS’s drafters
could not have been to include suits to protect individual
rights. 59 The international duty theory acknowledges that the
prevailing view of international law in 1789 may have been
limited to nations only, but asserts that the drafters, moved by
a sense of duty, nevertheless intended the ATS to allow
international law to be applicable by individuals. 60 That is, the
drafters intended to allow any alien – not only ambassadors –
to utilize the federal courts to redress their injuries. 61 The
international duty view sees this early willingness to enforce
international law as “a badge of honor” for our young nation. 62
With these theories in mind, it remains unclear which,
if any, of these views of the ATS courts have adopted.
However, recent case law reflects a more expansive view of the
ATS than would be suggested by the denial of justice or
diplomatic safety theories. 63 Courts’ willingness to interpret
the ATS to include the rights of individuals is more compatible
with the international duty theory than with the other
theories. 64 The next section of this Note will review modern
case law, legislation, and commentary on the ATS.

59
See David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary
International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 332, 340
(1988); Beth Stephens, Accountability Without Hypocrisy: Consistent Standards,
Honest History, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 919, 922 (2002) (“Most international law before
World War II had governed interactions among states and their governments.”). Since
World War II, the international community often refers to the rules governing
interactions among nations as “public international law.”
Since international law (or the law of nations, as it was then called) at the
time of the ATS’s enactment had little place for individuals’ rights, originalists take the
position that the ATS should be narrowly interpreted to exclude suits that vindicate
individual rights transnationally. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
60
Burley, supra note 36, at 475 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 881 (G. Chase 4th ed. 1923)).
61
This view is actually a type of originalist view in which the original facts
are in dispute. Judge Bork’s construction asserts that the prevailing view of
international law was limited to nations and that the ATS’s drafters meant the ATS to
accord with that view. Professor Burley suggests that the prevailing view was not as
narrow as some assert, or that even if it was so narrow, the drafters deviated from this
prevailing view to go above and beyond their duty to comply with the prevailing narrow
view of international law. Id. at 477.
62
Id. at 464.
63
See Willett, supra note 34, at 3.
64
Id. (“[T]hat the new nation ‘was ready to shoulder a perceived national
duty to enforce international law as it related to individual conduct’ . . . . resonates in
the modern-day lawsuits instituted under the Alien Tort Statute.”).
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Modern Applications of the Alien Tort Statute

As previously mentioned, the ATS remained essentially
unnoticed for almost two centuries. 65 After World War II, the
global community’s view of international law changed. 66 The
scope of international law expanded to include laws governing
the relationships between states and individuals and between
individuals of different nations. 67 Utilizing this new conception
of international law, alien plaintiffs began to sue in U.S.
district courts under the ATS. 68 These plaintiffs enjoyed little
success until courts and scholars took notice of the ATS’s
potential as a human rights enforcement tool. 69 In 1980, a
Paraguayan father and daughter brought the ATS into the
spotlight by suing an official of the militaristic Paraguayan
government for the wrongful death of their son/brother. 70 The
Second Circuit’s decision in that case, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,
began a debate that has since greatly broadened the ATS’s
applicability. 71 Before Filártiga, courts read the ATS narrowly;
65
A database search on the ATS returned about ten scholarly articles
published before 1980. Approximately 1300 articles are now available, over 1100 of
which were published within the last ten years. A database search of cases mentioning
the ATS returns over 300 cases total, with about 200 of these decided in the last ten
years, but only about two dozen cases before 1980. Only two of these pre-1980 cases
found jurisdiction under the ATS. See infra note 72.
66
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815,
831-32 (1997) (noting that the Nuremberg trials “shattered” the old conception of
international law).
67
See Burley, supra note 36, at 490-93. For a review of updates to the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law that reflect this change in the content of
“international law,” see infra note 77.
68
See, e.g., Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A, 255 F.
Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dismissing the case where Greek plaintiff sought
damages for an injury in violation of a maritime treaty); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv.,
Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1973) (affirming summary judgment for defendants
because Nigerian plaintiffs alleging violations of the Thirteenth Amendment and
international prohibitions against slavery failed to establish that labor was forced).
69
See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); Thomas P.
Crotty, Note, The Law of Nations in the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction over Tort
Claims by Aliens Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 1 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 71, 71 (1977).
70
See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
71
See id. at 887 (establishing that the ATS provides jurisdiction over
extraterritorial suits); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (interpreting the ATS narrowly and providing three divergent rationales
in concurrences); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(reinterpreting the ATS broadly and partially refuting the Tel-Oren reasoning),
reconsideration granted in part by 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (mem.); see also
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
(1991) (“In Filártiga, transnational public law litigants finally found their Brown v.
Board of Education.”) (citation omitted).
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only two pre-Filártiga cases allowed jurisdiction under the
ATS. 72 Since Filártiga, human rights plaintiffs have frequently
asserted jurisdiction under the ATS. 73 Recent cases brought
under the ATS tend to seek redress for violations of treaties
such as the Geneva Conventions or for violation of general
international norms such as those proscribing torture, slavery,
and genocide. 74
1. Early ATS Cases Used the Narrow Interpretation
Initially, almost no court held that the ATS granted
jurisdiction over extraterritorial torts. 75 While the effect of the
ATS was clear – that district courts have jurisdiction over cases
alleging violations of the “law of nations” – its scope was not.
The content of the “law of nations,” 76 now commonly referred to
72

See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-65 (D. Md. 1961) (regarding child
custody dispute between aliens in which a falsified passport provided the violation of
international law); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.C.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607)
(concerning title to slaves aboard an enemy ship captured at sea); see also Randall,
supra note 32 (reporting that the ATS had been invoked only twenty-one times before
Filártiga, and jurisdiction granted only twice); Kontorovich, supra note 30, at 202 &
n.111 (discussing Bolchos and noting the progression from “only faint glimmerings of
universal jurisdiction” to the formal recognition of universal jurisdiction in Filártiga).
73
See infra note 122 for examples of scholarly articles highlighting the
human rights potential of the ATS.
74
For examples of cases seeking to vindicate international human rights
norms, see infra notes 118-20, 122-30, and accompanying text.
75
See supra note 72 for a review of these cases; see also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
792-93 & n.24 (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing the pre-Filártiga narrowness of the
ATS); Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 7 & n.12 (2002) (noting the rare use of ATS before Filártiga).
76
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). The debate over extraterritorial jurisdiction is
lively. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988)
(noting the debate among academics regarding the ATS). But see Beanal v. FreeportMcMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997) (“The current view of § 1350 is
that it grants a federal cause of action as well as a federal forum in which to assert the
claim. . . . [S]ection 1350 is appropriately used by individuals asserting claims for
violation of international law of human rights.”) (citations omitted), aff’d, 197 F.3d 161
(5th Cir. 1999).
Two camps have emerged with interpretations of the ATS that advance
their causes. On one side, human rights advocates, scholars, and practitioners support
a “cause of action” interpretation. They argue that the ATS provides both jurisdiction
and a cause of action, or, alternatively, that it allows the cause of action to be found in
domestic tort law, customary international law, or in the domestic tort law of a foreign
nation. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding
Congressional intent to broaden the ATS and Congressional approval of courts’
interpretations to include a cause of action in the ATS); Casto, supra note 53, at 471-72
(advocating that the ATS “should be construed as liberally as possible”).
The opposition, including international corporate interests and economists,
tends toward a jurisdiction-only interpretation. That is, they read the ATS narrowly to
grant jurisdiction over cases brought with an independent cause of action. See, e.g.,
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as international law, was uncertain at best. Thus, the primary
limitation on the ATS’s scope was courts’ narrow interpretation
of the term “law of nations.”
The law of nations has its origins in governing the
relationships among national governments. 77 As a type of
“international common law,” its boundaries and requirements
are rooted in customary protocols and the practical necessities
of dealing with other nations. 78 This narrow conception of
international law does not leave room for individual rights. 79
Thus, an interpretation of the ATS relying on this narrow
conception would reject many modern ATS cases that have
been successful. For example, courts interpreting “law of
nations” narrowly would not have subject matter jurisdiction
over a suit brought by a Panamanian citizen against an
American corporation alleging labor abuses amounting to
torture. Since the body of law that dictates relationships
among nations does not control this hypothetical suit (because
the plaintiff is not a nation, but an individual citizen), the suit
would fail. The modern conception of international law is
broader; it recognizes the rights of individuals as within the
scope of international law. 80 This broader conception was a
gradual change that crystallized after World War II. 81
The legal fallout of the atrocities committed in Nazi
Germany effectively internationalized certain broadly-

Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, J., concurring) (“[T]his provision . . . is merely a
jurisdiction-granting statute and not the implementing legislation required by non-selfexecuting treaties to enable individuals to enforce their provisions.”).
77
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1 (1965) (“‘International law,’ as used in the Restatement of this Subject,
means those rules of law applicable to a state or international organization that cannot
be modified unilaterally by it.”). The definition of international law changed in the
Third Restatement to acknowledge the growing understanding that international law
could affect the rights of individuals. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (“International law . . . consists of rules
and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of states and of
international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of
their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”) (emphasis added), id. § 101
reporter’s n.1 (explaining the change from the previous Restatement) (1987).
For purposes of this discussion, the term “international law” will be used
interchangeably with the term “law of nations” used in the ATS. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
78
This is traditionally referred to as “customary international law.” See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. c
(1987).
79
See id. § 101, reporter’s n.1 (1987).
80
Id. § 101.
81
See Stephens, supra note 59, at 922-23 (noting changes in international
law precipitated by World War II).
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recognized human rights standards. 82
The short list of
internationally acknowledged inderogable norms referred to as
jus cogens encompasses the worst of these atrocities. 83 This list
is informal, but some of its contents are undisputed:
prohibitions against piracy, torture, and genocide, for example,
are all well-accepted jus cogens norms. 84 One contested item
that some argue to be on this list is terrorism. While most
authorities agree that the international community universally
prohibits terrorism, the specific activities that are included in
terrorism remain undefined. 85
Prior to 1980, courts interpreted the ATS using the
narrow conception of international law as the meaning of “law
of nations,” which preserved the ATS’s obscurity. 86 The Statute
“awoke” in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala when the Second Circuit
used the broad conception of the ATS to allow individual claims
against violators of international law. 87
2. Filártiga Broadened the Alien Tort Statute’s Scope
Professor Harold Koh referred to Filártiga v. Peña-Irala
as the Brown v. Board of Education of transnational public

82

Id.
See, e.g., PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES] (“For purposes of these Principles, serious crimes under international law
include: (1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against peace; (5) crimes
against
humanity;
(6)
genocide;
and
(7)
torture.”),
available
at
http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf; Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus
Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411,
413-14 (1989) (“Most areas of great human rights concern – illegal treaties,
humanitarian (armed conflict) law, apartheid, genocide, torture, violations of the right
to life and the plight of refugees – are governed by jus cogens.”).
84
See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (1994)
(reviewing jus cogens and its relationship to foreign sovereign immunity). The
Restatement of Foreign Relations includes, inter alia, state-sponsored torture, slavery,
genocide, and disappearance as violations of international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987); see also id. cmt. c (“The
customary law of human rights is part of the law of the United States to be applied as
such by State as well as federal courts.”).
85
See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 83 (noting the drafters’ exclusion of
terrorism). Terrorism has resisted precise definition. Though actions may be
described – or, unfortunately, recounted – that are universally agreeably terroristic,
there remains no standard to determine whether any given action is terroristic. That
is, until a better definition is stated, the international community will have to know
terrorism when it sees it.
86
See supra note 72.
87
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1980).
83
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law. 88 The Filártiga court combined a modern interpretation of
the “law of nations” with the very old Alien Tort Statute to
arrive at the conclusion that the district courts could hear
extraterritorial claims. Thus, the court found that it had
jurisdiction over the case, setting precedent that made the
possibility of redress available to similarly situated plaintiffs
everywhere. 89
The plaintiffs in this case were Dr. Joel Filártiga and
his daughter, both Paraguayan asylum seekers in the United
States.
They brought their wrongful death suit against
defendant Americo Peña, a Paraguayan police official in the
militaristic government of President Alfredo Stroessner. 90 The
plaintiffs accused Peña of involvement in the death by torture
of Joelito Filártiga, Dr. Filártiga’s son, in political retaliation
for Dr. Filártiga’s opposition to the Stroessner government. 91
The district court below had dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction by adopting the narrow meaning of
The district court reasoned that
“law of nations.” 92
international law or the law of nations referred only to those
laws governing relations among nations (this body of law is
now called “public international law”). 93 The Second Circuit
found this view of “international law” to be unacceptably
narrow, so it rejected the district court’s narrow construction
and opened the door to the expansive use of the ATS today. 94
The Filártiga court went on to broadly construe the
ATS’s reference to international law. 95 The court recognized
that modern international law governs the relationship
between a government and its citizens. 96 It thus held that the
plain language of the ATS granted jurisdiction over a cause of

88
See Koh, supra note 71, at 2366 (“In Filártiga, transnational public law
litigants finally found their Brown v. Board of Education.”) (citation omitted).
89
See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 879, 888-89. The Filártiga plaintiffs eventually
won a ten-million-dollar damages judgment. Id.
90
Id. at 878.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 880.
94
In overturning the district court’s narrow interpretation, the Second
Circuit noted that the district court founded that narrow interpretation on dicta from
two Second Circuit cases. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
95
Id. at 881 (“[C]ourts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789,
but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”). The Supreme
Court would later adopt a sympathetic view in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004), discussed infra.
96
Id. at 888-89.
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action in tort in violation of international law, and that torture
was such a violation. 97 Since Filártiga, the general trend in
ATS litigation has been expansive. 98 This trend, however, has
not been without interruption. A District of Columbia Circuit
Court opinion posed a significant threat to Filártiga’s rationale.
Dismissing the plaintiffs’ case in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, a D.C. Circuit three-judge panel disapproved of
the Filártiga court’s reasoning. 99 The Tel-Oren plaintiffs were
mainly bus passengers and surviving families of passengers
who were injured or killed in an armed attack against a civilian
bus in Israel. 100 The district court below had dismissed the
plaintiffs’ case against those allegedly responsible for the
On appeal, the plaintiffs
murder of their relatives. 101
maintained that the ATS provided jurisdiction for their claims
because the defendants’ actions constituted a violation of
international law, as the Filártiga court had defined it. 102 The
D.C. Circuit upheld the dismissal in a very brief opinion, but
each member of the three-judge panel wrote a substantial
concurring opinion founded on largely independent grounds
from the others. Judge Edwards’ concurrence agreed with the
principles established in Filártiga, but distinguished Tel-Oren
on its facts. 103 Judge Bork’s concurrence agreed with the
district court’s reasoning in its dismissal – because the ATS did
not itself supply a private cause of action, the plaintiffs had
97

Id. at 880, 890. The Torture Victim Protection Act later explicitly
established a corresponding cause of action to enforce the right. See infra Part II.B.3.
98
For examples of the cases that have followed in the Filártiga chain, see
infra notes 118-20, 122-30, and accompanying text.
99
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (“Judge Edwards contends, and the Second Circuit in Filártiga
assumed, that Congress’ grant of jurisdiction also created a cause of action. That
seems to me fundamentally wrong and certain to produce pernicious results.”).
100
Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 789-91 (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing the appropriate scope of
the ATS, i.e., whether it should be read broadly to supply a cause of action or strictly to
supply jurisdiction only).
103
Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring). Edwards agreed with the Second
Circuit that the ATS conferred jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of substantive
international law. Id. at 777-78 (“The Second Circuit did not require plaintiffs to point
to a specific right to sue under the law of nations in order to establish jurisdiction
under section 1350; rather, the Second Circuit required only a showing that the
defendant’s actions violated the substantive law of nations.”). However, he reasoned
that there was no firm consensus on the content of international law. He felt that
without further clarification from the Supreme Court, courts should not apply the ATS
to groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization because they do not operate as
state actors or under color of state law. Id. at 791-95 (“Against this background, I do
not believe the consensus on non-official torture warrants an extension of Filártiga.”).

1392

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:3

failed to show a cause of action. 104 Judge Robb differed from
both of his colleagues, holding briefly that he found the case to
be a nonjusticiable political question. 105 Though in 1991
Congress
provided
some
guidance
regarding
ATS
interpretation, the broad view of the ATS (shared by the
Second Circuit, Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, and others)
would remain at odds with Judge Bork’s Tel-Oren opinion for
years to come. 106

104
Id. at 800-01 (Bork, J., concurring). This is the “jurisdiction-only” view of
the ATS. In order for the Tel-Oren case to proceed, Bork thought that the plaintiffs
would need to state an independent cause of action. Id. at 800 & n.5. By likening 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (granting federal jurisdiction to disputes arising under inter alia treaties
of the United States) to § 1350, the district court found that the ATS granted only
jurisdiction, but did not include a private cause of action. Id. at 800. Thus, according
to Bork, plaintiffs would need a treaty granting a private cause of action for the case to
proceed. Judge Bork then held that since none of the treaties cited by the plaintiffs
created an express or implied cause of action, the district court had properly dismissed
the case.
Judge Bork also noted that federal adjudication could interfere with
American diplomatic efforts, a concern that parallels the political question rationale
adopted in Judge Robb’s concurrence. Bork felt that these questions were essentially
diplomatic in nature and thus inappropriate for judicial scrutiny. Id. at 805.
105
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring) (“But both Judges Bork
and Edwards fail to reflect on the inherent inability of federal courts to deal with cases
such as this one. It seems to me that the political question doctrine controls. This case
is nonjusticiable.”). Judge Robb lamented that the federal courts could not help future
plaintiffs “maimed or murdered at the hands of thugs clothed with power who are
unfortunately present in great numbers in the international order.” Id. He condemned
the attack as “barbarity in naked and unforgivable form,” but felt that the courts
should not attempt to determine whether individual acts of aggression amount to
violations of international law. Id. (“Courts ought not to engage in [the search for the
least common denominators of civilized conduct] when that search takes us towards a
consideration of terrorism’s place in the international order.”). Robb opined that
drawing lines between acceptable state actions and unacceptable terrorism was not an
appropriate task for the judiciary.
106
See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 242-47 (2d
Cir. 2003) (reviewing Filártiga, Tel-Oren, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, and concluding that “neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has definitively
resolved the complex and controversial questions regarding the meaning and scope of
the [ATS].”); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(discussing and rejecting the Tel-Oren concurrences of Judges Bork and Robb, and
finding jurisdiction over a suit brought by Argentinean citizens living in the United
States against a former Argentinean general for kidnapping and torturing their son to
death as part of a national security operation in Argentina’s “dirty war”), reconsidered
in part by Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that
plaintiffs had shown sufficient agreement among nations to establish a cause of action
in international law for the tort of “causing disappearance”). The Supreme Court
eventually considered the appropriate breadth of the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004), discussed infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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3. The Torture Victim Protection Act Supports the
Expansive Interpretation
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”) was
the first substantive change to the ATS since its enactment. 107
The TVPA did not change the statutory text of the ATS, but
added a note defining torture and extrajudicial killing 108 and
establishing a cause of action under the ATS for aliens to
remedy those offenses. 109 Congress enacted the TVPA in order
to comply with the United Nations Charter and other
international treaties. 110 The note added by the TVPA instructs
courts that torture and extrajudicial killings constitute offenses
in violation of international law. 111 Thus, the TVPA is an
advisory corollary to the ATS explicitly granting jurisdiction
over tort cases brought by aliens seeking to redress torture or
107
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005)). The previous amendments and recodifications were essentially administrative, not substantive. They merely changed
the wording of the ATS from its original text to reflect modernized legal terms. See
Bradley, supra note 7.
108
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 3.
109
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note §
2(a)(1) (“An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual . . . .”); see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d
Cir. 1995) (discussing and applying the TVPA and noting that the ATS may also be
applied to non-state-actor defendants).
110
The stated purpose of the act was “[t]o carry out obligations of the United
States under the United Nations Charter and other international agreements
pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery
of damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.” Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 73. Congress’
statement of the rationale underlying the TVPA evinces the international duty theory
of the ATS’s enactment in 1789, see supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text, and
affirms that theory’s applicability to modern times.
One of the “international agreements” to which the law refers is probably
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51/Annex (1984). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (“[T]he United
Nations shall promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.”).
111
Before the TVPA, the federal district courts were fragmented on whether
torture was a sufficient cause of action. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp.,
835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) (“‘Official torture’ has been recognized as an
actionable tort under the Alien Tort Statute in some jurisdictions and not in others.”).
The TVPA, perhaps in response to this fragmentation, made clear that torture gives
rise to a cause of action under the ATS. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(1) (“An individual
who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages
to that individual . . . .”).
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extrajudicial killing.
Additionally, the TVPA is a
Congressional acknowledgment and approval of the ATS’s use
for human rights enforcement. 112 At least some courts have
interpreted the enactment of the TVPA as legislative
permission, if not a mandate, to continue expansion of the
ATS’s breadth. 113 Thus, the TVPA served as a booster shot for
the ATS’s growing scope. This expansive view of the ATS has
continued through a string of suits against individual
government officials (not the governments themselves) and
against multi-national corporations.
4. Post-Filártiga Applications Rely on the Expansive
Interpretation
The most recent applications of the ATS have involved
international human rights enforcement. The plaintiffs in
these cases filed ATS suits to redress human rights abuses by
multinational corporations, 114 abuses by government actors, 115
112
See 137 CONG. REC. H11244 (1991) (“[T]he Torture Victim Protection Act,
H.R. 2092, puts torturers on notice that they will find no safe haven in the United
States. Torturers may be sued under the bill if they seek the protection of our shores
or otherwise subject themselves to the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court.”)
(comments of Romano L. Mazzoli, D-Ky.). The TVPA’s legislative history echoes the
Second Circuit’s statement in Filártiga that “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer
has become – like the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind.” 630 F.2d at 890.
113
Judge Hatchett, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel of the Eleventh
Circuit, affirmed a decision by District Judge Tidwell awarding damages against a
former Ethiopian government official involved in the plaintiffs’ detention, torture, and
disappearance:

Lastly, we find support for our holding in the recently enacted Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). In enacting the TVPA, Congress endorsed the
Filártiga line of cases:
The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a
cause of action that has been successfully maintained under an
existing law, section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien
Tort Claims Act), which permits Federal district courts to hear
claims by aliens for torts committed “in violation of the law of
nations.”
Congress, therefore, has recognized that the Alien Tort Claims Act confers
both a forum and a private right of action to aliens alleging a violation of
international law.
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86). This
language is also an example of the “cause of action” interpretation of the Statute. See
supra note 76.
114
See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Doe v.
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or abuses by government contractors, the topic of this Note. 116
One class of these cases involves plaintiffs subjected to human
rights violations committed in connection with multinational
corporations’ labor practices. 117 For example, the ATS was the
jurisdictional vehicle for a series of high-profile cases brought
against the multinational petroleum conglomerate Unocal for
its use of forced labor in the “Yadana Project” in Burma. 118 A
group of Indonesian citizens filed a similar case in the District
of Columbia against ExxonMobil Corporation, alleging murder,
torture, rape, and genocide committed by the Indonesian
Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal. 2000), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
115
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995); Chiminya
Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Plaintiffs alleged that
ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front], in an effort to suppress political
opposition, and acting in concert with Mugabe and other high-ranking Zimbabwe
government officials, carried out a campaign of violence against them that included
extra-judicial killing, torture, seizure of property and terrorizing.”).
Frequently, human rights groups such as the Center for Constitutional
Rights (“CCR”) represent the injured plaintiffs, as they did in Filártiga. For a list of
cases in which the CCR has participated, see Center for Constitutional Rights,
International
Human
Rights,
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/human_rights
/human_rights.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2005). The CCR has taken an active role in
promoting investigations of the Abu Ghraib abuse scandals, as well. After a courtmartial sentenced Specialist Charles Graner for his involvement in the abuse, the CCR
“responded to the Graner verdict by calling for a special prosecutor to investigate Mr.
Rumsfeld’s role in creating policies that governed treatment of prisoners.” Kate
Zernike, High-Ranking Officers May Face Prosecution in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse, Military
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 8.
116
See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2005)
(naming private contractor-corporations operating in the government’s Abu Ghraib
detention facility as defendants); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1088 (S.D.
Cal. 2004) (same); Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345-46 (D.N.J. 2004) (naming a
private contractor-corporation operating a correctional facility as a defendant).
117
This class of cases often includes a collaborative effort between a local
government and an offending multinational corporation.
See generally Tobias
Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002). Plaintiffs have brought up to fifty such ATS suits against
MNCs. See Willett, supra note 34; Kenny Bruno, De-Globalizing Justice: The
Corporate Campaign to Strip Foreign Victims of Corporate-Induced Human Rights
Violations of the Right to Sue in U.S. Courts, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 2003, at
13 (article written by ATS plaintiffs’ co-counsel reviewing the history of the ATS and
discussing its modern human rights applications).
118
See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal.
2000), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Collingsworth,
supra note 5, at 186-95. The Yadana Project involved the construction of an oil
pipeline, a collaborative effort of Unocal, the militaristic Burmese government, and
Total, a French oil company. See id. at 184 n.15.
The Unocal plaintiffs based their suit on an at least expansive, if not
creative, interpretation of the ATS, so corporations and human rights groups greatly
anticipated the Unocal holding. Unfortunately for the international legal community,
the parties have tentatively agreed to a settlement, so the case will set no precedent
after all. Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at 1.

1396

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:3

military, then employed as the defendant’s security forces. 119 In
another recent example, labor unions brought actions against
Coca-Cola in Columbia for paramilitary suppression of union
activities. 120 Though their outcomes are mixed, these cases
illustrate the trend in use of the ATS as a human rights tool
against corporations. 121 Though scholars and practitioners
have written a great deal on the topic, 122 this Note will not deal
extensively with the effectiveness of such suits against
corporate defendants or the propriety of various types of cases.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to show that a growing
number of plaintiffs are using the ATS to combat human rights
violations committed by international corporations. 123
Another class of cases brought under the ATS focuses on
government officials. These cases often seek to vindicate
tortious violations of international law arising from oppression
in unstable political conditions. 124 For example, the Second

119

Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005).
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
121
Some argue that cases against multinational corporations stand to cause
more economic harm than good. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35. Cf.
Willett, supra note 34. To minimize frivolous suits, however, courts have applied a
more searching review before finding jurisdiction for cases under the ATS. Kadic v.
Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d
20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005). This closer inspection of the plaintiffs’ claims is intended to
ensure that an actual violation of international law has taken place, so ATS suits are
less likely to be used as a harassment tactic. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238. Further, these
suits typically allege harms on the order of torture, murder, and slavery, so the rights
infringed are more serious than those involved in garden-variety tort suits.
122
See, e.g., David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44
VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 941-43, 961 (2004) (discussing standards applied in evaluating ATS
liability); Pagnattaro, supra note 18, at 262-63 (emphasizing the global responsibility
to make remedies available for human rights abuses); Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing
Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 104-114, 143-47 (1999) (analyzing past ATS cases and
suggesting cautious use of the ATS to provide remedies against multinational
corporations). But see, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret
the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 68-69 (2004) (arguing against selective use of
international materials in Constitutional interpretation and noting with respect to the
ATS that America “stand[s] virtually alone in the world in creating a civil cause of
action for human rights violations”); Kontorovich, supra note 30, at 202-03, 208-09
(arguing that traditional universal jurisdiction rationales are inapplicable to support
the ATS).
123
The specific circumstances under which such cases should be allowed is
highly contentious and would be ill-addressed here. This Note intends only to show the
current uses of the ATS and presumes that among this class of cases are at least some
instances of appropriate and beneficial litigation.
124
For examples, see infra notes 125-30. The reader should note that the
defendants in these suits are not the governments, but the individuals within the
government responsible for the violation of international law. The Foreign Sovereign
120
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Circuit held that Bosnian victims could sue under the ATS for
alleged genocide and torture committed by officers working for
Radovan Karadžić, resulting in further expansion of the
Statute. 125 Similar cases against government officers have
alleged human rights violations in the Philippines, 126
Ethiopia, 127 Chile, 128 Zimbabwe, 129 and Mexico. 130 Again, this
Note deals with ATS cases against U.S. government
contractors, so these ATS suits against foreign government
actors are included to illustrate the broadening interpretation
of the Statute.
The debate over the appropriate scope of the ATS
continues. 131 The current U.S. government and some corporate
defendants seem less supportive of a broadly-read Statute than

Immunities Act controls federal jurisdiction over suits against governments. See infra
note 150.
125
See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40. Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought a
complaint against Karadžić, who was in command of Bosnian-Serb military forces, for
various atrocities, including rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and
summary execution. Id. at 236-37. The Kadic court rejected the state action
requirement that had proven fatal to the plaintiffs’ case in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Kadic held instead that plaintiffs may sue
individual actors in their personal capacities for violations of international law, i.e.,
that state action is not a necessary element of an ATS suit. Id. at 239-40.
126
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). Philippine
nationals brought a claim against Ferdinand Marcos for human rights abuses, such as
torture, summary execution, and “disappearance,” that occurred during his rule of the
Philippines. Id. at 771.
127
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996). Former prisoners in
Ethiopia filed lawsuit against Negewo, an official of “the Dergue,” a military
dictatorship governing Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, charging him with responsibility for
their torture and other cruel acts in violation of international law. Id. at 845-46.
128
Cabello Barrueto v. Fernández-Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla.
2002). The representative of an executed former Chilean official brought an ATS suit
against a member of the Chilean military group responsible for his death. In 1990, the
Chilean Supreme Court granted amnesty to military officials who had committed
human rights violations during the time of the execution. Id. at 1327.
129
Chiminya Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiffs brought a case under the ATS and Torture Victim Protection Act claiming
the defendant participated with other Zimbabwean government officials in extrajudicial killing, torture, seizure of property, and terrorizing. Id. at 265.
130
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). A Mexican national
abducted and brought to the United States to be prosecuted for murder was acquitted
and brought a suit under the ATS and Federal Tort Claims Act against the U.S.
government, the DEA, and Mexican policemen and civilians. Id. at 697. The Supreme
Court, however, found that under the Alien Tort Statute a single illegal detention of
less than one day of a Mexican national was not a violation of any provable norm of
customary international law. Id. at 736-37 & n.27.
131
See, e.g., id. at 698-99; In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Bruno, supra note 117 (describing the debate
over broad or narrow interpretation of the ATS).
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the Congress that enacted the TVPA. 132 Case law, however,
shows a judicial commitment to – or at least acceptance of – the
expansive view of the ATS set forth in Filártiga. 133
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain squarely confronted the issue of the ATS’s scope
(though it hardly resolved the issue). 134 Sosa clarified that the
ATS not only provides jurisdiction, but also provides causes of
action based on international norms if certain standards are
met. 135 The Court held that “[federal] courts should require any
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” 136
Courts thus remain able to enforce international law,
including human rights standards. 137 This Note highlights one
type of suit in which the ATS’s utility is threatened: ATS suits
against U.S. government contractors. A certain common law
Defense protects government contractors from tort suits,
undermining the ATS’s human rights potential. The next part
of this Note will explain this defense, its origins, the policies on
132
See Brief of Amici Curiae United States of America at 4, Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628 (9th Cir. May 8, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/
press/2003/05/doj050803.pdf (arguing that Congress enacted the TVPA not to commend
and encourage expansive interpretation, but to specify limited terms under which the
suits should be allowable), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2005); cf. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The Executive Branch
has emphatically restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be
found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other
violations of international humanitarian law.”).
133
See supra note 113 (illustrating the expansive view); see also Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004) (“It would take some explaining to say now
that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm
intended to protect individuals.”).
134
542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
135
Id. at 713-14.
136
Id. at 725. The Court explained further that “federal courts should not
recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international
law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.” Id. at 732.
A footnote in Sosa noted, but did not address, the issue at the heart of this
Note. Id. at 732 n.20 (“A related consideration is whether international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”).
137
See id. at 729 (2004) (noting that with respect to judicially-created causes
of action based on international norms, “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping”); Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still
Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 567 (2005)
(noting that the Sosa decision limited the purposes for which the ATS may be used, but
cemented its use for the most egregious violations of international norms); see also
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Willett, supra note 34, at 16-24.
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which the Supreme Court founded it, and how defendants may
raise it.
III.

BACKGROUND OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
DEFENSE

The Defense is a federal common-law judicial doctrine
that shields a contractor-defendant from liability when the
federal government controlled its actions. 138 The doctrine
extends the federal government’s umbrella of sovereign
immunity to protect those manufacturers who essentially acted
as instruments of the government. 139 The primary goal of the
Defense is to protect government autonomy in procurement of
goods through its contractors. 140 Principles of agency and
sovereign immunity are the foundation of the Defense’s
rationale. 141 Courts reason that suits against contractors would
increase contractor costs and that contractors would pass these
additional costs on to the government, which generally enjoys
sovereign immunity to such suits. 142 The Defense’s reasoning is
that if the government is immune and a contractor is merely
executing the will of the government, the contractor should be
immune. 143 Thus, the Defense holds that a manufacturer
should not be held responsible for injuries caused by a defective
product when the government directed the product’s design
and manufacture. 144
From a policy perspective, the Defense stands to reason
in certain typical situations.
In order to encourage
participation in government contracts and encourage
competition and an ample supply of available products and
138

See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). There is no
statutory basis for the Defense; it is essentially a part of the federal common law. Id.
at 504 (“[W]e have held that a few areas, involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ are so
committed . . . to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where
necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by
the courts – so-called ‘federal common law.’”) (citations omitted).
139
Id. at 512.
140
Id. at 511-12.
141
Id. at 524-25; see id. at 527-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142
Id. at 510.
143
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
144
See Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government Contractor
Defense: Breaking the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 403, 405-08 (1998) (reviewing the
origins of the Defense); see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21
(1940) (disallowing suit against a contractor whose construction work gave rise to a
state claim for soil erosion on the theory that contractor was executing the will of
Congress).
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services, the Defense minimizes the liability burden that
contractors must assume. 145 This section will outline the
foundations of the Defense and the reasoning in the case that
established the Defense, Boyle v. United Technologies. 146 Since
the Defense is essentially an outgrowth of sovereign immunity,
a brief discussion of sovereign immunity will help illuminate
the policies underlying the Defense.
A.

Foreign and Domestic Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity has its roots in historical deference
to state actions. 147 Initially, government actors enjoyed broad
immunity from judicial process. 148 But as governments began
to engage in less traditionally sovereign activities, the
international community responded by limiting the doctrine. 149
There are two sides to sovereign immunity in American
law, foreign and domestic. Foreign sovereign immunity deals
with the liability of foreign governments in domestic courts
while domestic sovereign immunity deals with the liability of
the federal and U.S. state governments in domestic courts. The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) codified the
American approach to foreign sovereign immunity. 150 Since
145

These policy implications of the Defense will be discussed more fully infra

Part IV.A.1.
146

487 U.S. 500 (1988).
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
148
See, e.g., Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96 (1937) (“[N]o rule is better settled
than that the United States cannot be sued except when Congress has so
provided . . . .”).
149
A letter issued by Jack B. Tate of the State Department explained the
“restrictive theory” of immunity and adopted that view as the position of the U.S.
government. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dep’t of State Bull.
984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15
(1976).
150
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-1611); 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2005) (“[A]
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”); see, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2005) (denying immunity from claims of state-sponsored
terrorism). But see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
438 (1989) (“We think that Congress’ decision to deal comprehensively with the subject
of foreign sovereign immunity in the FSIA . . . preclude[s] a construction of the Alien
Tort Statute that permits the instant suit.” (citations omitted)).
The reader should note that courts have interpreted the ATS to provide
jurisdiction over individual government actors in their individual capacity, see Kadic v.
Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995), but not over the governments themselves.
Courts have specifically excepted foreign governments from liability in ATS suits,
noting that the FSIA controls these suits. However, legal scholars and at least one
147
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this Note focuses on the liability of contractors working for the
U.S. government, the FSIA serves mainly as a point of
reference.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) controls domestic
tort immunity of the U.S. government. 151 Again, history firmly
established the default rule of state immunity; American
common law adopted this rule as a part of our English
heritage. 152 This default remains in effect today; the U.S.
government may not be sued without its permission. 153
However, Congress gave permission to sue for large classes of
cases by enacting the FTCA, broadly waiving sovereign
immunity subject to certain exceptions. 154 Some important
exceptions to the FTCA’s waiver of immunity retain immunity
in situations likely to give rise to ATS suits. For example, the
government remains immune to claims arising in a foreign
country 155 and to claims related to military action. 156 These
exceptions and others prevent an injured alien from suing the
U.S. government directly for the actions of its contractors
under a theory of respondeat superior. 157

court have thought that courts should deny immunity (otherwise permitted under the
FSIA) to rogue nations in order to hold the nation itself liable for heinous human rights
violations. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (reversing the jurisdiction asserted by the District Court of the District of
Columbia in a case brought by a Holocaust survivor against the German government
for slave labor reparations). The majority opinion was not entirely opposed to the
reasoning of Judge Wald’s dissent. Id. at 1174 n.1.
151
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (2005) (granting jurisdiction over claims
against the United States government and limiting jurisdiction and damages in certain
cases).
152
See Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
153
See Fox, 300 U.S. at 96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A(1) (1979)
(“Except to the extent that the United States consents both to suit and to tort liability,
it and its agencies are immune to the liability.”).
154
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A cmt. b (1979).
155
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2005).
156
Id. § 2680(j) (2005).
157
See Id. § 2680(a), (h), (j), (k) (2005) (retaining sovereign immunity for
claims based on exercise of discretionary function by government employees, arising
out of intentional torts, arising out of combatant activities, or arising in a foreign
country, respectively); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18-19 & n.6 (D.D.C.
2005) (noting exceptions in the FTCA that might retain sovereign immunity in an ATS
case).
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The Boyle Rationale: Protect Government Autonomy
with Private Immunity

The Defense has no statutory foundation; it is a judicial
creation. 158 The Supreme Court recognized the Defense and
adopted the test currently used to apply it in Boyle v. United
Technologies. 159 Boyle was a diversity action brought by family
members of Boyle, a U.S. Marine helicopter copilot who
drowned in a military exercise off the coast of Virginia. 160
When Boyle’s helicopter crashed into the ocean, the pressure of
the surrounding water trapped Boyle inside, pushing the
helicopter’s door hatch closed. 161 Boyle’s family sued the
manufacturer of the aircraft for, inter alia, negligence and
breach of warranty in the hatch design. 162 The district court
awarded a jury verdict for plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the “military
contractor defense” barred the suit. 163 On appeal, the Supreme
Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that military contractors
should be protected, but based its opinion on a different
rationale. 164
Without a waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity,
of course, a case cannot proceed against the government. 165 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned in Boyle that since Feres protected the
government from tort suits by military personnel, the same
doctrine should also protect military contractors from liability
to military personnel. 166 That is, in order to protect the
158
Despite the urging of government contractors to legislate a defense for
them, Congress remained “conspicuously silent” on the issue. See Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 n.1 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing a string of
legislative hearings on the topic of indemnification of civil liability for government
contractors).
159
See id. at 506-12.
160
See id. at 502-03.
161
Id. The hatch only opened outward. This was the design flaw for which
Boyle’s survivors sought to hold the manufacturer responsible. Id. at 503.
162
Id.
163
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503.
164
Id. at 512-13. The Fourth Circuit had relied upon the doctrine established
in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Feres doctrine recognizes that the
Federal Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity to military personnel
injured in their military service. Id. at 146. Before Boyle, courts frequently used the
Feres analysis in cases similar to Boyle. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510 (citing Bynum v. FMC
Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 59697 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983)).
165
See supra note 153.
166
See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Stencel
Aero Eng’g. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977)) (“Such pass-through costs
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government fully from the costs of injuries to military
personnel, contractors should also be protected from these
costs, lest the contractors pass them on to the government
through increased contract rates. 167
When Boyle reached the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s holding, but explicitly rejected
the Fourth Circuit’s Feres analysis and methodically explained
why that rationale was unacceptable. 168 For purposes of this
Note, Justice Scalia’s narrowness argument is of particular
interest. The Court’s assertion that a Feres rationale would fail
to bar civilian suits clearly decides that at least some cases
brought by civilian plaintiffs are undesirable. 169 The Boyle
majority supports this position with an exception to the waiver
of sovereign immunity in the FTCA. 170 This exception retains
would . . . defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the
government itself.”). The Fourth Circuit decided Tozer on the same day as Boyle, using
the same reasoning.
167
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
168
Justice Scalia wrote:
We do not adopt [the Feres] analysis because [applying the Feres doctrine]
logically produces results that are in some respects too broad and in some
respects too narrow. Too broad, because if the Government contractor
defense is to prohibit suit against the manufacturer whenever Feres would
prevent suit against the Government, then even injuries caused to military
personnel by . . . any standard equipment purchased by the Government,
would be covered . . . . On the other hand, reliance on Feres
produces . . . results that are in another respect too narrow. Since that
doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the
military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a
civilian’s suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state
tort theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of
noise produced by the jet engines. Yet we think that the character of the jet
engines the Government orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by
state tort law, no more in suits by civilians than in suits by members of the
Armed Services.
Id. at 510-11.
169
Specifically, those civilian cases are undesirable that would “regulate”
government design decisions.
Justice Scalia uses the example of a tort suit
“regulating” a government officer’s selection of a jet engine. See supra note 168.
170
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. The exception cited is 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the
“discretionary function” exception to the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity.
This part of the FTCA retains immunity for
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
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immunity in cases where a government official exercises
discretion in performing an official function. 171 Thus, by the
Boyle majority’s reasoning, the Defense protects the exercise of
discretion in federal procurement from “regulation” by State
tort law. 172
Since the Boyle decision, government contractors have
had shelter under the theory that protecting the government’s
interests in flexible military procurement includes protecting
Thus, Boyle extends the umbrella of
its contractors. 173
sovereign immunity to shield those contractors sufficiently
engaged in providing government equipment. 174 Under the
current formulation of the Defense, a contractor must satisfy
three prongs: specification, conformance, and disclosure. 175
Justice Scalia explained that the first two prongs were to
ensure that the facts are such that liability would threaten a
government officer’s “discretionary function.” 176 These prongs
identify the product in question as embodying the will of the
government (as opposed, for example, to stock catalog products
designed exclusively by the contractor). The third prong,
disclosure, is a safety measure to eliminate a harbor in which
contractors could silently ignore known product defects that
could jeopardize their contract. 177 That is, the third element
creates an incentive for contractors to make relevant
information known by exposing them to liability if they fail to
reveal such information. 178
171

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
Id. (“[W]e think that the character of the jet engines the Government
orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by state tort law, no more in suits by
civilians than in suits by members of the Armed Services.”).
173
See, e.g., Lewis v. Babcock Indus., 985 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying
Boyle); Quiles v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165-70 (D. Mass. 1999) (same).
174
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
175
The Court adopted the Fourth (and Ninth) Circuit standard in Boyle:
172

Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of
the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
Id. at 512.
176

Id.
Id. at 512-13.
178
See id. Notably, the Court rejected a different standard for the Defense
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in a similar case, Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace. Id. at
513 (citing Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985)).
The Eleventh Circuit’s alternate formulation allowed the Defense in cases where a
contractor either had only marginal design input or had significant design input, but
177
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The Supreme Court cemented the judicial doctrine of
the Defense by resolving a circuit split and setting the
standard for raising the Defense. 179 Boyle established that the
purpose of the Defense is to ensure government autonomy in
its product procurement by extending the sovereign immunity
reserved for governmental “discretionary functions” to
contractors carrying out the discretion of the government. 180
C.

Hudgens Extends the Defense to Services Contracts

Since Boyle, the Defense has expanded. The Eleventh
Circuit recently held that the Defense was valid for service
contracts, as well. 181 The court reasoned that the same policy
for making the Defense available in products liability suits
against suppliers also applies when victims sue for harms
caused by service contractors. 182 The extension of the Defense
to service contractors is important because in practice, service
contractors are more likely to violate human rights than
manufacturing or design contractors. 183
In summary, the government contractor defense extends
sovereign immunity to contractors who operated as agents of
warned the government of defects and was authorized to proceed nonetheless. Shaw,
778 F.2d at 746. The Supreme Court found that this approach would chill contractor
participation by rewarding avoidance of design input. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513. That is,
by failing to immunize unconditionally contractors who had exercised significant
design input, the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation would discourage contractors from
active engagement with product design. In rejecting this formulation, the Supreme
Court found that the harms of contractor non-participation outweighed the value of a
more narrowly tailored and easily applied test.
179
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512-13.
180
Id. at 511-12.
181
Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding a
helicopter maintenance company not liable to surviving family of U.S. Army pilots who
died when government officers instructed maintenance personnel not to examine the
helicopter for certain wear defects).
182
Id. at 1333-34. This reasoning is interesting because service contract suits
are likely to rest on a negligence theory, while strict liability governs suits brought for
harms caused by defective products. The different standards are important because
disallowing the government contractor defense in suits against service contractors
leaves them to defend a case in negligence, arguably an easier battle than a products
liability case. Thus, taking the shield of the Defense away from contractors is less
disadvantageous to the service contractor (the type of contractor more likely to violate
human rights) than taking the same shield from a manufacturing or design contractor.
183
Service contractors by definition require performance of a service, such as
a helicopter repair technician, or more suitably for purposes of this Note, an
interrogation specialist. These service contractors will have greater exposure to aliens
who might bring ATS suits than would, for example, a manufacturer-contractor
producing an engine part. It would be much more likely that a private military
translator or interrogator would violate an alien’s human rights than would an
equipment provider.
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the government. 184 The next part of this Note specifies issues
that arise in ATS suits alleging human rights violations by
U.S. government contractors 185 and then suggests that barring
the Defense in ATS suits resolves many of these issues. 186
IV.

DISCUSSION

The Defense should not be allowed in ATS cases because
the Defense thwarts the purposes of the ATS. Courts have
recently accepted the ATS, at least to a limited degree, as a
human rights enforcement mechanism. 187 The Defense is a
shield of sovereign immunity, owned by the government, but
used by private contractors. The government extends this
shield to contractors to protect the government’s discretion in
procurement of goods and services. 188 The ATS and the Defense
collide when alien plaintiffs use the ATS to sue government
contractors over violations of international law. This impacts
not only the remedy available to an injured alien, but also
limits the ATS’s potential as a human rights enforcement
mechanism. Cases of collision are likely to occur more
frequently due to increasing federal reliance on contractors,
especially in military operations. 189 This part of the Note will
first highlight the individual issues that arise from the conflict
between the ATS and the Defense. 190 Then, it will argue that
the best solution is a general ban on the Defense in ATS suits,
subject to a case-by-case exception for executive orders
specifically granting immunity. 191
A.

Problems with Allowing the Defense in ATS Suits

The conflicting policies behind the ATS and the Defense
create a problem for courts in cases where government
contractors tortiously injure aliens.
The American
184
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A(1)
(1979) (“Except to the extent that the United States consents both to suit and to tort
liability, it and its agencies are immune to the liability.”).
185
See infra Part IV.A.
186
See infra Part IV.B.
187
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
188
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
189
P. W. Singer, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, estimates that
more than 20,000 non-Iraqi individuals were working for private military contractors
(“PMCs”) in Iraq in mid-2004. See Dart, supra note 25.
190
See infra Part IV.A.
191
See infra Part IV.B.

2006] ALIEN TORT STATUTE & GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS

1407

government’s increasing reliance on private military companies
(“PMCs”) in its operations abroad exacerbates this conflict. 192
With this trend toward privatization of military functions, the
frequency of cases in which aliens are tortiously injured by
government contractors and their employees, so-called
“corporate warriors,” 193 is bound to increase. 194 Alien plaintiffs
have filed several such cases in the district courts in the last
decade. 195 With the American military presence in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, military contractors will
certainly be in a position to violate aliens’ human rights. 196
Thus, identifying, analyzing, and resolving the conflicting
policies between the ATS and the Defense will become
increasingly important. 197 The following sections identify some
of the particular and interrelated issues that arise in ATS suits
against U.S. government contractors.

192
See Abigail Heng Wen, Note, Suing the Sovereign’s Servant: The
Implications of Privatization for the Scope of Foreign Sovereign Immunities, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1562-63 (2003); Gail Gibson & Scott Shane, Contractors Act as
Interrogators; Control: The Pentagon’s Hiring of Civilians to Question Prisoners Raises
Accountability Issues, BALT. SUN, May 4, 2004, at 1A.
For a list of PMCs involved in the Iraq war and the roles they play there,
see Topsy N. Smalley, Military Contractors, http://www.topsy.org/contractors.html (last
updated Jan. 2006).
193
The current industry comprises several hundred companies competing for
more than $100 billion in contract revenue. P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum
of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
521, 523-24 (2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles
/fellows/singer20040122.pdf (noting that modern international law is not well-suited to
regulate the sharp global trend toward military privatization).
194
See P. W. Singer, Nation Builders and Low Bidders in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2004, § A at 23 (“From the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison to the mutilation of
American civilians at Falluja, many of the worst moments of the Iraqi occupation have
involved private military contractors ‘outsourced’ by the Pentagon.”). Singer has
written extensively on the topic of PMCs, including the current depth of their
involvement in the Iraqi occupation.
195
See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2005)
(naming private contractor-corporations operating in the government’s Abu Ghraib
detention facility as defendants); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1088 (S.D.
Cal. 2004) (same); Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345-46 (D.N.J. 2004) (naming a
private contractor-corporation operating a correctional facility as a defendant).
196
See Smalley, supra note 192 (showing the magnitude of the PMC
involvement in Iraq).
197
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17-19 (D.D.C. 2005) (refusing
to consider whether the government contractor defense bars claims alleging torture
until after discovery has taken place).
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1. The Defense Facilitates Liability Laundering in
Spite of Human Rights Norms
Allowing contractors to use the Defense enables a type
of liability laundering scheme. Put differently, allowing the
Defense creates a loophole in which the government can wash
its hands of political or financial responsibility by assigning the
liability to its contractors, whom the Defense will immunize. 198
If the government can depend on the Defense to protect its
contractors, then it would be advantageous to assign
government “dirty work” to the contractors. The contractors, in
turn, will happily take on these jobs because the government’s
immunity will protect them from liability. 199 In court, the
contractor would merely need to show a governmental exercise
of discretion and that the contractor reported potential flaws in
the plan to the government. 200 This liability laundering not
only enables the sorts of practices the United States openly
condemns – such as torture 201 or slavery 202 – but also removes
the political accountability essential to keeping the government
honest. 203
This loophole means the government could use creative
corporate structures as shelters from the liability of a specific
military operation that could be questionable in the light of
international law. 204 Military intelligence gathering provides a
timely example of how such a scheme might work. 205 The
government could benefit by torturing a captured soldier in
order to extract information, but it might face international
reproach for its actions. 206 After all, international consensus
198

Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
Id.
200
This exercise of discretion need not be highly visible, “perhaps no more
than a rubber stamp from a federal procurement officer who might or might not have
noticed or cared about the defects, or even had the expertise to discover them.” Id. at
515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201
See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 §§ 2, 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(2005) (creating an explicit cause of action for torture and specifying that torture is a
violation of international law which triggers jurisdiction under the ATS); see also supra
note 112 (quoting legislative comments regarding the TVPA).
202
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
203
Recent American proactivity in the name of defense of human rights would
seem to be at odds with such an outcome. See Stephens, supra note 59, at 922-24.
204
Id.
205
This is not to make any claims as to the facts of cases like those of the Abu
Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay detainees, but rather serves as a hypothetical illustration.
206
Some nations employ a similar method of liability laundering to diffuse
responsibility for torture. This method, often called “rendition,” utilizes other nations
199
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condemns torture as a method of intelligence gathering. 207 And
locally, the TVPA, a federal statute, expressly denounces
torture and provides a cause of action to redress this activity. 208
To avoid reproach, among other reasons, the government would
not use uniformed military personnel for this type of mission.
However, an entrepreneurial privateer could fill this niche by
forming a corporation to carry out a specific mission for which
the government could not use uniformed military personnel.
This way, if publicly exposed, the contractor would shield the
government from outrage, which the public would direct
primarily at the contractor. At the same time, the corporation
could use the Defense to retain its profits from the illicit
endeavor. 209 The net result would be a public relations victory
for the government and a financial win for the contractor.
One might argue that if courts allow contractors to raise
the Defense, accountability would flow from the contractor to
the government. The argument is that because a contractor
raising the Defense would need to prove that the government
ordered the contractor to act in violation of international law,
the public would know of the government’s responsibility. 210
This perfect transfer of accountability from the contractor to
the government, however, is unrealistic. Nevertheless, such a
chain of delegation would at least diffuse the blame for
activities in violation of international law. For example,
photographs of uniformed military personnel engaged in
human rights abuses, such as those seen following the
incidents at Abu Ghraib, provoke criticism from the American
instead of private contractors. A nation in possession of a prisoner “renders”
(transfers) a prisoner into the custody of another nation with the diplomatic assurance
that the prisoner will not be tortured. This assurance amounts to a wink and a smile
between nations who fully intend that the prisoner be tortured to extract useful
information. See Human Rights Watch, “Outsourcing” Torture, http://www.hrw.org
/campaigns/torture/renditions.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
207
Though the definition of torture may be disputed, civilized nations
unquestionably agree that torture is a jus cogens offense. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES,
supra note 83, at 9 (“Human rights abuses widely considered to be subject to universal
jurisdiction include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture.”);
Parker & Neylon, supra note 83, at 413-14 (“Most areas of great human rights
concern – illegal treaties, humanitarian (armed conflict) law, apartheid, genocide,
torture, violations of the right to life and the plight of refugees – are governed by jus
cogens.”).
208
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005)
(expanding the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, by creating an explicit
cause of action for torture victims); see also supra note 112 (quoting legislative
comments regarding the TVPA).
209
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
210
The contractor would need to prove it was the government’s agent. See id.
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Those pictures are powerful; they speak for
public. 211
themselves. In contrast, a second, similar photograph of
civilian military contractors engaged in identical behavior
would require a caption explaining that the subjects of the
photograph were government contractors with specific orders
from the government to carry out the violative actions. This
second photograph would elicit less public criticism of the
government because people would focus their outrage on the
contractors who perpetrated the wrong instead of on the
government, which ordered that the wrong be committed.
Thus, as a public relations matter, the government would prefer
the latter scenario.
Even if the public attributes some
responsibility for such actions to the government, the
laundering tactic at least allows diffusion of blame.
If Congress and the federal courts allow defendants to
raise the Defense in ATS suits, they create a loophole through
which the government may diffuse or eliminate responsibility
for acts in violation of international law. A nation committed to
preventing torture and tyranny around the world 212 should be
wary of such covert activities.
2. Allowing the Defense Threatens National Security
and Credibility
If one of the initial purposes of the ATS was to prevent
an alien injury or an incident such as the Marbois Affair from
escalating to armed conflict, 213 one might draw modern analogs
that illustrate the ATS’s relevance. Of course, today, there is
less concern that “denial of justice” to an alien will incite that
alien’s nation to declare war against the United States. 214 But
today, America is more concerned that the mistreatment of
aliens will lead to terrorist retaliation against American
citizens abroad or at home. 215 Thus, a modern incarnation of
211

See, e.g., Zernike, supra note 115.
See David E. Sanger, Bush Hails Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at 1
(“‘The people of Iraq have spoken to the world, and the world is hearing the voice of
freedom from the center of the Middle East,’ Mr. Bush said . . . after the polls closed in
Iraq.”).
213
See Burley, supra note 36, at 464; see also supra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing
the denial of justice and diplomatic safety theories of the ATS’s enactment).
214
See Gathii, supra note 47 (emphasizing the United States’ enormous global
influence).
215
Kenneth Roth, Letter to the Editor, Torture, Terror and the Law, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2004, at 24 (noting that the precedent set by some disputed
interrogation methods approved by the Bush administration “endangers Americans
212
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the original purpose of the ATS might be avoidance of a
terrorist backlash against American citizens in Iraq or America
for the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.
In addition to threatening national safety, allowing the
Defense conveys impertinence to the international community.
Arguably, the drafters of the ATS had the foresight to recognize
the increasing importance of international cooperation. 216 By
that view, the ATS is a courtesy extended, if not a duty owed, to
the citizens of nations with which Americans transact business
and exchange culture. 217 If international cooperation was
indeed a part of what the drafters of the ATS had in mind,
allowing the Defense in ATS suits would defeat their intent by
barring redress and deterrence of human rights abuses. That
is, hiding our contractors behind the wall of sovereign
immunity would tarnish the ATS, an American “badge of
honor.” 218
3. Contractor Immunity Defies the Ubi Jus, Ibi
Remedium Principle
Alien plaintiffs injured by U.S. contractors have two
potential paths to redress: they may attempt to sue the
government or the contractors. Courts might not allow ATS
plaintiffs to sue the government for reasons of sovereign
immunity, discussed above, 219 and the Defense would bar a suit
against the contractor. 220

and others in custody. It also encourages the excesses of Abu Ghraib, undermines
international cooperation in fighting terrorism and provides a boon to terrorist
recruiters.”).
216
Whether one favors the international duty theory of the origin of the ATS
or the denial of justice or the diplomatic safety theory, each leaves room for the idea
that the drafters of the ATS were concerned with international cooperation to minimize
conflict.
217
See Burley, supra note 36, at 481.
218
Id. at 464. Even if the ATS’s drafters were not acting from a sense of
international duty, in today’s internationalized world, such a sense of duty may be
nonetheless desirable.
219
Sovereign immunity will bar these claims. Exceptions to the FTCA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity are likely to apply to ATS plaintiffs, so immunity will be
retained and ATS plaintiffs will not be able to sue the government. See supra notes
151-57 and accompanying text.
220
See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). But see Jama
v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 361 (D.N.J. 2004) (denying summary judgment because
plaintiffs’ allegations of “inhumane treatment of a huge number of persons accused of
no crime and held in confinement” were sufficient international law violations to
establish a claim against a government-contractor defendant under the ATS).
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According to the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium, each
right must have a remedy. Chief Justice Marshall commended
this principle in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection. . . . “[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law, whenever that right is invaded.” 221

Marshall went on to discuss the importance of the
availability of remedies to the integrity of American
government:
“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury
its proper redress.” The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. 222

International consensus holds that certain human
rights are elevated to the level of jus cogens. 223 If ATS
plaintiffs’ human rights are to be protected, 224 there must be a
remedy; the ATS provides a path to that remedy. If a
contractor working for the U.S. government – often an
American corporation 225 – injures an alien plaintiff, it makes
sense that the most effective remedy to vindicate this right
would lie in an American court. But sovereign immunity
prevents recovery against the government, 226 leaving the
contractor as the only alternative defendant.
If the
government contractor defense is allowed in ATS suits, all
paths to redress are blocked for ATS plaintiffs injured by
government contractors.

221
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23). Of interest for the purposes of this Note is that
Justice Marshall used the word “individual” and not “citizen.”
222
Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 109).
223
See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of
international human rights norms into American law).
224
In Sosa, the Supreme Court limited the violations which give rise to ATS
jurisdiction, but acknowledged that at least some jus cogens norms are included. Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (“[C]ourts should require any claim based
on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”).
225
See, e.g., Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004).
226
See supra Part III.A.
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One could argue that local (foreign) courts or
international tribunals would vindicate their threatened rights.
But local people in regions where foreign military forces are
active are unlikely to have access to effective courts. Even in
cases where a stable and untainted justice system is available,
judgments entered against contractors by local courts are less
likely to be satisfied than judgments by U.S. district courts.
Similarly, international tribunals are complicated by significant
jurisdictional issues, in part because they are typically
convened to address the fallout of a singular crisis rather than
to deal with ongoing violations. 227 These potential solutions are
inadequate to provide reliable (or possibly any) remedies to
alien plaintiffs.
B.

Solution: Disallowing the Defense in ATS Suits

The obvious solution would be to bar the Defense
entirely in suits with jurisdiction founded upon the ATS. That
is, when aliens seek redress for extraterritorial torts, Congress
or the courts could suspend the Defense for policy reasons.
Disallowance of the Defense would change the focus of
litigation from the application of the Defense (i.e., determining
the degree of government oversight of the contractordefendant) 228 to human rights enforcement (i.e., whether the
action was a tort and whether it was in violation of
international law). 229
Disallowance of the Defense in ATS suits might raise
contractors’ costs, but this increase can be viewed as full
227
For example, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia was limited to certain crimes during the Yugoslav conflict of the
early 1990s. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 1-5,
May 25, 1993 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170-74, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoce/index.htm. The International Criminal Court, effective in 2002, is still in its infancy
and the United States has not submitted to its jurisdiction. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icccpi.int; Vicki C. Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 343 n.228
(2006).
228
The Ibrahim case illustrates the focus on these administrative details:

More information is needed on what exactly defendants’ employees were
doing in Iraq. What were their contractual responsibilities? To whom did
they report? How were they supervised? What were the structures of
command and control? If they were indeed soldiers in all but name, the
government contractor defense will succeed, but the burden is on defendants
to show that they are entitled to preemption.
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 22-23 (D.D.C. 2005).
229
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (2004).
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internalization of the costs of their commercial activities. This
internalization would give alien tort victims a means to redress
for the contractors’ wrongful actions while deterring future
wrongful activities. 230 In ATS suits, the wrongful actions are
violations of international law; deterring such serious
violations outweighs the increased contractor costs. To further
tailor the solution, Congress could mitigate the harms of
mechanical disallowance of the Defense by allowing executive
orders to immunize contractors in individual cases of
exceptional importance.
Disallowance of the Defense would achieve consistency
of purpose. The American government is willing to hold officers
of foreign governments responsible for their offenses by holding
them liable in their personal capacity. 231 These individuals are
actors within their government – agents, in a way. 232 Cases
discussing the Defense frequently reason that contractors are
acting as the government’s agents. 233 Since U.S. courts have
been willing to try abusive officers of foreign governments as
agents of those governments (whether or not they qualify as
state actors), it seems courts should also be willing to try
contractors engaged as agents of the U.S. government. If
contractors are the private muscle of the government, why
should they receive any more sovereign immunity protection
than the defendant-dictators that courts have already held
Further, the modern, restrictive conception of
liable? 234
sovereign immunity is that state actors are only immune for
those acts that are traditionally sovereign in nature. 235 Torture

230
See Willett, supra note 34, at 36 (noting that corporations are responding
to ATS litigation by enacting new policies against human rights violations).
231
See Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We do not agree
that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state
action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals.”).
232
Id. at 245 (“In construing the [TVPA] terms ‘actual or apparent authority’
and ‘color of law,’ courts are instructed to look to principles of agency law. . . .”). For
example, by carrying out orders to force a village into slave labor, an individual
officer – military or bureaucratic – is acting on behalf of a government.
233
See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 525 (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“The action of the agent is ‘the act of the government.’”) (quoting
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 22 (1940)).
234
See supra notes 125-30.
235
Letter from Jack B. Tate to Philip B. Perlman, supra note 149; see supra
note 231 (quoting the Second Circuit’s holding in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40, that state
action is not necessary to hold a government officer personally liable).
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is hardly an appropriate sovereign activity to which courts
should extend immunity.
Further, the exposure of a government contractor to
liability from alien plaintiffs is not a legal novelty. The risk of
contractor liability to aliens is no different than the risk of
liability that any run-of-the-mill business expects in the
regular course of dealings with American citizens. 236
1. How Disallowance of the Defense Might Be
Implemented
The Defense could be disallowed in two ways – judicially
or legislatively. First, federal courts could disallow the Defense
as a matter of policy, holding that the Defense cannot nullify
the ATS’s purpose. Courts could rely on the latitude granted by
Sosa to hold that orders to violate international human rights
norms are not within the discretion of government officials. 237
In so holding, courts would decide that contractors are not
entitled to the immunity conferred by the “official discretion”
exception because there is no protectable exercise of discretion
by a government actor. 238
This judicial disallowance could stand on its own or be
supplemented (or supplanted) by legislation. Congress could
enact legislation, possibly amending the ATS itself, clarifying
that courts are not to allow the Defense in ATS suits. 239 The
legislative method could also include an exception whereby an
executive order could grant immunity on a case-by-case basis. 240
236
Any business expects some exposure of tort liability, including liability for
the actions of its employees. Businesses are arguably on better notice when dealing
with non-citizens that they should look out for the interests of those affected by their
work.
Government contractors could harly complain that ATS suits create
unforeseeable liabilities. Nor can they claim that they will be overwhelming in
number. ATS suits are harder to bring than garden-variety tort suits because the tort
alleged must amount to a violation of international law. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (limiting the causes of action available to ATS plaintiffs);
Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining the
requirements for a prima facie case under the ATS).
237
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-33 (2004).
238
See Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 361 (D.N.J. 2004) (denying
summary judgment on ATS claims against a contractor operating a detention center).
239
This might look something like the Torture Victim Protection Act’s
clarification that torture and extrajudicial killing are offenses that give rise to
jurisdiction under the ATS, and supply a cause of action in international law. 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005).
240
Congress could also create explicit guidelines for how and when the
Executive may issue such an Order. This would help prevent the exception from
swallowing the rule. For example, Congress might include a guideline requiring
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Officers within the Executive Branch might recommend that
the President issue an order immunizing a specific defendant
or defendants as needed. Such immunization orders are not
uncommon. For example, in 2003, President George W. Bush
issued a broad executive order categorically immunizing from
tort liability any defendant involved in the Iraqi petroleum
industry. 241 Default liability would provide plaintiffs with a
path to redress and deterrence in almost all cases, while the
executive order exception would retain flexibility in exigent
cases. Further, since the executive branch would need to act
affirmatively to immunize defendants under this approach, the
executive officers would assume at least some political
responsibility for the results of the immunity.
This approach neatly addresses liability laundering by
assigning responsibility to contractors in the general case and
to the Executive Branch in exceptional cases. It also means
that plaintiffs will usually have a means to recover for their
injuries and deter future human rights violations. 242

evidence that a contractor would be unable to provide a critical service during a time of
crisis if held liable in a specific suit. Such guidelines might prevent the Executive from
issuing a string of boilerplate immunity orders when engaging in projects. This
approach allows Congressional control over the situation in which the executive branch
may issue an order.
To ameliorate rock-and-a-hard-place decisions where a contractor must
choose to risk liability in tort or in breach, a defense or cause of action could be created
to complement their liability. Such a defense could protect contractors from suit where
they denied a government’s instructions in a good faith belief that the instructions
were in violation of international law – this would at least insulate the contractor from
liability to the government and the injured. More proactively, a cause of action could
allow contractors to recover some or all of the value of their contract when they have
failed to perform the contract for international illegality. This cause, a type of
indemnity or hold-harmless suit would burden the government directly with the cost of
the lost performance (which the government would need to cover at its own expense)
and some part of the contract (perhaps under an unjust enrichment theory). Such a
cause of action would minimize a contractor’s fear of being given illegal instructions,
but would arguably create some amount of hesitation for government officials in
issuing orders to contractors. How often and to what extent this hesitation would occur
and whether it is desirable are questions outside the scope of this discussion.
241
Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May 22, 2003).
242
While disallowing the Defense may be the easiest path to clear for ATS
plaintiffs, there are certainly other options available. For example, Congress could
amend the FTCA to allow suits against the government or allow ATS suits under
occupation law. See Scheffer, supra note 28, at 858-60 (suggesting a re-examination of
the principles underlying occupation and trusteeship law to protect transitional
societies such as modern Iraq). These solutions are somewhat more complex than
disallowing the Defense, but could be implemented alternatively or to complement the
solution suggested here.
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2. Disallowance Protects Desirable Discretion While
Deterring Human Rights Abuse
One potential argument against denying immunity to
contractors is that liability to aliens for the actions of their
personnel would discourage contractors from engaging with the
government on foreign missions. As mentioned above, an
instruction to a contractor to act in violation of international
law puts the contractor into a precarious situation. 243
Compliance with the instruction risks a tort suit by the injured
alien, while refusal to comply risks a breach suit by the
government. Though this exposure only arises when the
government issues questionable instructions, contractors may
not be able to tell if and when the government might do so.
Instead of being a drawback to disallowance, this grey
area might be a benefit, as it creates a desirable reluctance to
carry out those orders that are in or near the realm of human
rights violations.
Liability would force participating
contractors to monitor their personnel carefully and to refrain
from engaging in questionable activities. Full liability might
deter undesirable behavior, a function the tort system serves
particularly well.
Though the Boyle majority adopted the Defense to
protect the discretion of American officials, there was clear
division within the Court regarding the impact of tort litigation
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
on official discretion. 244
Blackmun reasoned that while it is not impossible for
contractors to pass the costs of tort suits on to the government,
the impact that these costs would have on a government
officer’s discretion would be “marginal.” 245 Marginal is hardly a
word that could be used to describe the countervailing human
rights abuses that the Defense helps enable in ATS suits. The

243
One example of such an instruction might be to torture information out of
a prisoner in violation of the Geneva Convention. See supra note 240.
244
See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515-31 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
245
See id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“On the one hand, whatever
marginal effect contractor immunity might have on the effective administration of
policies of government, its harm to individual citizens is more severe than in the
Government-employee context.” [internal quotation marks omitted]) (citing Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
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Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the effect of damages on
governmental decisions echoes this rationale. 246
Few would argue that government contracts are a risky
business. The government is a stable customer well-known for
providing amply for its vendors.
For various reasons,
competition for many contracts is limited to only a few bidders
and the government compensates those who bid well for their
products and services. It is unlikely that allowing tort liability
would bring the American military to a grinding halt. 247
V.

CONCLUSION

The government contractor defense protects contractors
on the theory that they are instruments of the government.
This makes sense in certain contexts. If a soldier is injured
when a government-designed rifle explodes in his face, the
Defense should insulate the government and manufacturer
from liability. 248 This insulation means that society is willing to
deny tort damages to soldiers because the soldiers’ injuries are
a part of the cost of national defense. That is, the nation
collectively agrees that the price of defending America includes
injuries to its military personnel. If Americans disagree with
this policy, they may use their political input (elective and
legislative) to create a cause of action through which injured
soldiers may recover damages. 249
This rationale holds as long as the plaintiff is an
American citizen. In contrast, an ATS suit has inherently
different facts. 250 The victim-plaintiff in an ATS suit does not
246
See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992) (declaring
the case justiciable in part because actions seeking damages are unlikely to interfere
with governmental processes, especially in military actions).
247
See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 202 (2004) (“In the authors’ view, the alleged
dilemma that forces the President to choose between protecting national security and
upholding the rule of law is a false dichotomy, at least insofar as the Geneva
Conventions are concerned.”).
248
The Feres doctrine embodies this rationale, but specifically immunizes the
government. This hypothetical is used to illustrate a situation where the Defense
legitimately immunizes a manufacturer-defendant.
249
In the Feres context, for example, Congress could enact legislation
overruling the Feres doctrine and allowing suits by injured military personnel against
the government.
250
Human rights violations are vastly different from negligent design. Courts
may protect a government purchasing officer or a manufacturer who negligently
designed, approved, or produced a faulty weapon, but it is hardly the same to protect
decisions that result in human rights violations. ATS suits present a unique subset of
the potential suits brought against government contractors. For ATS suits to survive a
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benefit from American national defense. Also, an ATS plaintiff
suing a government contractor must allege a violation of
international law to establish federal jurisdiction, so in an ATS
suit, more than a simple tort is on the line. It simply does not
make sense to say that an alien victim’s human rights are a
cost of American national defense, especially since the victim
has no political input, does not receive the benefit of the
national defense, and is less likely to have an alternative mode
of enforcement.
Despite the debate over the ATS’s original significance,
federal courts, 251 Congress, 252 and human rights groups 253 have
all recognized that the Statute is an important vehicle to
enforce human rights norms. The number of aliens tortiously
injured by U.S. government contractors (potential ATS
plaintiffs) is likely to increase proportionally with government
reliance on private military companies. 254
The government contractor defense legitimately seeks to
protect U.S. government autonomy in selecting product and
service contractors by immunizing contractors to prevent passthrough liability.
This immunity may desirably protect
autonomy in standard procurement situations, but it creates
unintended consequences in ATS suits against contractors.
Allowing the Defense in ATS suits allows liability laundering
by the government, enabling (if not promoting) human rights
abuses, like those that occurred at Abu Ghraib. 255 Allowing the
Defense in ATS suits also threatens American national security
and credibility by denying justice to those we purportedly seek
to help. 256

motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction, they must at least allege a
violation of international law. Violations of international law are, on some levels, more
important than standard state common-law tort suits. International law has been
reasoned to include jus cogens offenses like torture and genocide that arise from very
basic, uniform notions of justice and are only invoked in particularly egregious
circumstances. Since ATS suits are likely to rely on these offenses to confer
jurisdiction, ATS suits are a different animal than common-law tort suits.
251
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
252
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2005); see
also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing and applying the
TVPA); supra note 112 (discussing Congressional intent behind the TVPA).
253
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (seminal ATS case in
which plaintiffs-appellants co-counsel included attorneys from the Center for
Constitutional Rights).
254
See supra Part IV.A.
255
See supra Part IV.A.1.
256
See supra Part II.A.
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Finally, the Defense denies redress to ATS plaintiffs,
who are unable to recover damages from the government,
leaving no existing path to redress. 257 While other potential
legal paths to redress exist, 258 disallowing the Defense seems to
be the simplest of these paths to implement. 259
While certainly not a magic bullet, the ATS has a
sufficiently narrow scope to deter human rights abuses without
broadly depressing desirable economic activity or hindering
government autonomy. Even if one views the ATS as an
“awakening monster,” the potential number of ATS suits
against U.S. government contractors 260 is such a small a
fraction of ATS suits against multinational corporations 261 that
economic depression arguments simply do not attach. 262 The
immunity conferred by the Boyle line of cases protects
legitimate government autonomy in procurement, but should
not be extended to protect the grim autonomy exercised by a
government officer bent on torture, which surely does not
deserve the shield of sovereign immunity.
In conclusion, courts should, as a matter of policy, refuse
to allow government contractors to raise the government
contractor defense in cases where jurisdiction is based upon the
Alien Tort Statute. This policy would deter human rights
abuses without hindering appropriate government autonomy,
thus satisfying the policies underlying both the ATS and the
Defense.
Ryan Micallef

†

257
See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign
immunity) and Parts III.A, IV.A.3.
258
See supra notes 240, 242.
259
See supra notes 240, 242. For example, courts could initially decide to
disallow the Defense in ATS suits as a matter of policy. Later, Congress could amend
the FTCA to allow foreign claims or specifically allow claims under the ATS. Congress
could also create or amend jurisdictional statutes, including the ATS itself, to specify
which suits the courts may hear. Again, these latter options are outside the scope of
this discussion, but the reader should note that none of these possible solutions are
exclusive.
260
See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35.
261
This is because military contractors are but a fraction of the international
economy.
262
See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 35.
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